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[Book Excerpt] Collected Works of Yang Xiaokai (I)

7 min

Machine translation from the Chinese original, not reviewed by the author.

I. Spontaneous Order and Collective Wisdom

Edmund Burke, in his famous 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, already put forward the idea of spontaneous order.

He believed that advocates of radical change imagined they understood how existing institutions worked and where they failed, and thought that radical social change could improve people’s welfare.
But a working institution is often not designed by a few; it forms spontaneously through the interaction of millions, and it embodies the particular information of millions, information that only the parties involved understand. No individual can fully understand all of it. If any individual claims to understand the operation of the whole system and its defects, and wants to remake it through radical social movements, he will certainly destroy those marvelous mechanisms he does not understand.
He stressed that the function of social institutions cannot be fully understood by any single person (even a genius), just as ants cannot fully understand by what mechanical principles their anthill is designed.

Some have therefore called this kind of thought a religious superstition beyond human understanding.
But I believe this kind of thought makes good sense, because it shows that what arises spontaneously from the interaction of individuals in a group can, through a kind of collective wisdom (the invisible hand), reach a wondrous condition that individual wisdom cannot understand.

The fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism is not planning versus no planning, nor efficiency, but the mechanism by which institutions are formed.
Capitalist institutions are not designed by a government or by any person; they form unintentionally and spontaneously as millions of people freely choose contracts and institutions.
The US Constitution was not designed by any one person; it was argued into existence by representatives from many states. No one was satisfied with that constitution, yet everyone had to accept the compromise. The Constitution contained no design for party politics, but on fundamental rights everyone reached a compromise, and party politics arose unintentionally and spontaneously from the constitutional order.

Yang Xiaokai, The Relationship Between Political Reform and Economic Reform


II. State Opportunism

Main harmful consequences:
1. Confusing the roles of rule-maker and game participant;
2. Openly pursuing one’s own private interest at the expense of the public interest.

The indirect consequences of this state opportunism are more serious than the direct ones, because opportunistic government behavior makes the public no longer believe in the accepted rules of the game. Thus everyone’s behavior becomes thoroughly opportunistic: whenever it is to one’s advantage, one may disregard the moral code of society, and society becomes one in which theft and robbery run rampant and opportunism and rent-seeking prevail.

Many Chinese criticize traditional society for valuing traditional morality too much and the rule of law too little. But from our experience of living in Western society and from the law textbooks we have read, we can appreciate that moral norms are the foundation of Anglo-American common law and, to a certain extent, are more primordial and more fundamental than law. In Western society, various unwritten moral norms play a very important role and are held in higher regard.
A behavioral trait of many new immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong. If you observe them closely, they behave very politely in Hong Kong and do not litter, but once they pass the Luohu checkpoint and enter the mainland, they seem like a different person, and their speech and conduct become very rude and uncivil.
The difference is not necessarily due to law; it is caused by each person’s differing expectations of the moral demands that different social groups make on them. And such expectations of socially approved behavior are to a great extent influenced by government behavior.

If the government’s commitment to be responsible to the public and not to pursue private gain at the expense of the public interest is not credible, the following evils will follow:
First, social moral norms will decline steadily. State opportunism will set an example for the opportunistic behavior of everyone in society, and a society will emerge in which theft and robbery run rampant, private property is not respected, and people are not decent.
More frightening still, if the commitment to fair rules of the game is not credible, the behavior of all political figures will become thoroughly opportunistic, and therefore the ruling party cannot provide society with long-term stable order.

This kind of state opportunism has endless harmful consequences, because it fundamentally shakes confidence in fair rules of the game. Such confidence is extremely hard to build. It requires a very long, gradual process.
Do not think that it was easy for the British to establish this system in a few years (the Hong Kong constitutional reform led by Chris Patten). Without the Hong Kong government’s respectable (decent) behavior in Hong Kong for more than a hundred years, who would believe the Hong Kong government’s commitment to fair rules of choice?
And the turmoil in China over the past hundred years has all been caused by the government’s non-credible commitment to fair rules of the game.

Yang Xiaokai, The Relationship Between Political Reform and Economic Reform


III. Belief Systems

Ideology and belief systems determine codes of conduct and moral norms; these determine political institutions; political institutions affect legal and economic institutions; these in turn affect economic performance; and in a politically divided environment, how well or badly the economy performs will create enormous pressure of survival competition among rulers, and thus in turn affect ideology and belief systems (Belief System).
In this feedback chain, if the divided political entities share the same culture, the competitive pressure is greater, so the feedback effect of economic performance on ideology is more sensitive, and therefore the evolution of social ideology and institutions will also be faster.

Yang Xiaokai, The Pros and Cons of China’s Unification

Institutional evolution is determined by a feedback loop. This feedback loop begins with ideology. Ideology determines codes of conduct and moral norms. For example, there are certain behaviors we cannot accept, such as throwing dissidents into prison; we cannot accept this behavior. Why can we not accept it? This is determined by moral norms or conscience; codes of conduct and moral norms determine political institutions; political institutions determine legal and economic institutions; legal and economic institutions affect economic development; and economic development in a non-unified, pluralistic political environment will in turn affect ideology.

In places whose economic performance is too poor, because the larger surrounding environment is not unified, other countries will engage in political competition with them, for example war, using violence to force them to change; or free emigration. East Germany, for instance, was brought down by free emigration. Under such pressure, countries with poor economic performance are forced to change their ideology.
Thus a feedback loop is formed. From ideology to political institutions; from political institutions to economic performance; from economic performance back to ideology. In this feedback loop, the superstructure and the economic base determine each other. The premise for this feedback loop to form is that politics must be pluralistic.

Yang Xiaokai, The Development of Constitutional Government in China

Historical materialism holds that the economic base determines the superstructure. People from the mainland, especially people in intellectual circles, have a particularly superstitious faith in science. Everything has to be measured by whether it is scientific. But political and legal institutions play a decisive role in economic development. And these institutions do not come from science; not only do they not come from natural science, they do not even come from social science; they come from faith. It is faith and ideology that influence people and make them regard certain behavior as acceptable and other behavior as unacceptable. When society forms a consensus, there will be a mechanism called Social Sanction (social opposition and prohibition).

Changes in ideology are much slower than changes in hard institutions. Even if mainland China achieves a democratic political system and a legal system that protects private property, “private property is sacred and inviolable” and “the principle of self-determination of residents” (laissez-faire), these British ideological principles may still not be truly accepted by the Chinese people.

Yang Xiaokai, Christianity and Constitutionalism

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Next: [Notes] Yang Xiaokai Wenji (I): On Belief Systems

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[Book Excerpt] Collected Works of Yang Xiaokai (I)
The FeiThink Library
First published 2020.09.27

Fei Huang · Writes from Amsterdam on Kant, Dostoevsky, and the moral life.