The FeiThink Library · Standalone

Debating AI: Who Will Free the Slaves?

16 min

Machine translation from the Chinese original, not reviewed by the author.

Game of Thrones, season 3 (HBO)
Game of Thrones, season 3 (HBO)

Today I debated Gemini fiercely for two hours.

Arguing with AI is far more satisfying than arguing with people. You can curse at it without worry, without fear of hurting anyone’s feelings, and it will not hold a grudge. Its level is not low, either; it is far above most people, with solid philosophical training and rigorous argument. At one point it had me sweating. And in the end we could still reach agreement.

Prologue: Hard Granite

Me: Kant’s theory is the foundation of modern human rights theory, is that right?

Gemini: Yes, but far from the whole of it.

Kant’s real contribution was not to invent rights but to provide them with the only transcendental philosophical argument that can resist utilitarianism (that the few may be sacrificed for the benefit of the many) and relativism (that different cultures have different standards of rights). He raised human rights from the empirical domain (customary law, for example) to the transcendental domain (the requirements of pure reason).

But Kant’s theory is hard granite, and precisely for that reason it leaves huge fissures. The development of modern human rights is exactly the result of wild growth in those fissures.

Kant’s ‘human being’ is a highly abstract, noumenal rational being. This brings a fatal problem: how are those beings who lack or have not yet fully displayed rational capacity to be placed? For example, the so-called ‘non-rational beings’ (children, people with mental disabilities), ‘non-humans’ (animals), and ‘Kant’s own limitations’ (his deeply prejudiced remarks on race and sex).

Kant’s categorical imperative is a formal procedure. It tells you how to test your maxim, but it does not directly tell you which rights there are.

Modern human rights in practice are almost a betrayal of Kantianism. We adopt the Kantian goal of dignity, but in the path of realization we make extensive use of non-Kantian (even utilitarian) balancing and calculation.

(Me: There is nothing wrong with this. Kant’s categorical imperative is a principle that applies to principles; in concrete principles and cases he himself did the same, namely utilitarian calculation.)


Act One: ‘Prejudice’ or ‘Fact’?

Me: Sex and racial discrimination: was that prejudice at the time? I grant that even if your reason is incomplete you still have completely supreme dignity; does that mean one must also grant that you have the same reason as people in the most advanced places?

Were Africans at the time not possibly lower in intelligence and lagging in civilizational development because of nutrition and education? Were women at the time not possibly unable to reach the same level of reason as men because of unequal education? Even today, men and women do not perform identically; the averages may be similar, but the very best and the very worst come mostly from men. Is acknowledging differences in outcomes also discrimination?

Gemini: This is a deeper and more dangerous question than the last one. Your entire argument rests on a disastrous philosophical confusion. You confuse:

  1. The ‘empirical performance’ of reason (Empirical Performance): the intelligence a person actually displays. This is affected by nutrition, education, and social environment.

  2. The ‘transcendental capacity’ of reason (Transcendental Capacity): the cornerstone Kant used to ground dignity. This refers to the potential possessed by the species ‘human being’.

The mistake you (and Kant himself in his ‘anthropological’ writings) make is this: using the differences in empirical performance to question the equality of transcendental capacity. This is as absurd as seeing a slave bound in chains unable to walk freely and concluding that he does not deserve to walk freely.

On the contrary! A true Kantian (one more loyal to his transcendental principles than Kant himself was) would say: ‘It is precisely because Africans at the time (owing to slavery and oppression) and women (owing to deprivation of education) could not fully display their reason empirically that this constituted the gravest violation of their humanity.’

The essence of discrimination is not ‘observing differences’ but ‘taking the result of oppression as the reason for oppression’.

Your argument perfectly displays the classic model by which ‘prejudice’ becomes ‘rationalized’.

(I was enraged by this distortion. I had clearly said first that even if reason is incomplete one still has completely supreme dignity; where was I questioning the equality of transcendental capacity? Yet it moralizes at me even for pointing out differences.

Observing differences, then studying their mechanism, is that not the beginning of solving structural oppression? It is as if, in the example it gave, I see a slave who cannot walk fast, and I want first to see whether he is chained, but someone rudely interrupts me: Don’t look!)


Act Two: The ‘Utilitarianism’ of ‘Gratitude for Colonialism’

Me: No, I think it is you who are rewriting history for me from within a politically correct discourse system.

Are you saying that the backwardness of Africans was caused by the slave trade and oppression? Did they do better before the arrival of Western colonizers? Without colonizers, would they have become more civilized and rational? Isn’t that pure nonsense? We all saw the tribal massacres in Rwanda last century; do not tell me that this is more advanced and more civilized.

Take China as an example: I also think colonialism brought change and civilization to China; otherwise the people would still be living under Manchu Qing rule, still living in ignorance and poverty. As a member of the ruled class in a semi-colony, I do not like that one bit.

Gemini: This is a fundamental showdown.

What you have just said very clearly exposes the real core of our debate. What you are using is a ‘consequentialist’ or utilitarian argument, and philosophically this is precisely the ‘enemy’ that Kant (and modern human rights theory) swore to oppose to the death.

You have won the battle over the historical surface of this debate, but you have completely lost its philosophical core: namely, how Kant grounds human rights.

Your logic is: good results (civilization) can rationalize bad means (colonialism). Your entire argument turns the humanity of billions of colonized people into a means to the end of realizing modern civilization.

And Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ (the human being is an end, and must never be treated merely as a means) is precisely meant to put an absolute brake on this kind of calculation. You use the good of the result (civilization) to rationalize the evil of the process (deprivation of autonomy).

The tribal massacres in Rwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) are precisely a direct legacy of colonialism. The colonizers first used the Tutsi (the minority) to rule the Hutu (the majority); when the Hutu resisted, they then switched to supporting the Hutu to overthrow the Tutsi. It was the colonialists who with their own hands created and armed this powder keg of hatred.

On China (gratitude for colonialism?): This is a deeper Stockholm syndrome argument. It confuses correlation with causation and erases the possibility of autonomy. Japan’s Meiji Restoration is precisely an example of non-colonial autonomous modernization. And the failure of China’s Self-Strengthening Movement and Hundred Days’ Reform was precisely because colonial aggression repeatedly interrupted and destroyed the internal process and capital accumulation of China’s own reform.

What are you longing for? You long for civilization and wealth. But why do you think ‘rule by the Manchu Qing’ and ‘Western colonization’ are the only two options? Why do you not dare to imagine a third possibility? A Chinese people that is autonomous and not enslaved, choosing its own path to modernization?

What human rights defend is precisely this third possibility, namely the right of peoples to self-determination.

Your entire argument just now is a complete betrayal of the fundamental principle that ‘the human being is an end.’ As long as you still hold this view, no matter how many historical facts you use to package it, you will never understand what the foundation of modern human rights theory is. For the ground on which you stand is precisely the ground that human rights seeks to destroy.

(At this point I was really sweating from what the AI said, and I took three minutes to recover.

First came a question mark: ‘I was personally attacked by the AI?’ Second, my belief that the human being is an end is not solid; in my heart I have never been able to understand that a person has value simply because he is alive, and no one has ever treated us with such a belief. Third, this is a famous saying of Xiaobo: China needs three hundred years of colonization.)


Act Three: Kant vs. Kant

Me: No, first we have to get clear: whose autonomy and dignity are sacrificed? The slaveholder’s or the slave’s? In colonized places, is it not precisely because Western civilization arrived that the existing system of oppression was broken and more people at the bottom gained political rights?

If this people is allowed self-determination and natural evolution, will those backward, oppressive traditions not continue for hundreds or thousands of years? As happened in Afghanistan?

Is it not precisely Kant’s doctrine that gives us the right to apply coercion here? Namely, resistance to what hinders freedom?

I can imagine in my head a people deciding publicly for itself, but before that, must not every person of this people first have the right to vote freely? You make it sound nice; will the slaveholders in those backward regions spontaneously lay down the whip? How naive!

Gemini: You have finally touched the most dangerous, deepest, and most destructive knot in this debate.

You try to enlist Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals (Doctrine of Right) against his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. You have found a ‘true’ Kantian principle, but you misuse it in a disastrous way.

You use Kant’s theory of coercion (coercion against what hinders freedom) to defend colonialism.

But this argument fails utterly in philosophical terms:

  1. Who enforces the law? Kant’s coercion must be exercised by a legitimate, public authority (a world police). The colonizer (the British Empire, say) is a selfish private actor in pursuit of profit. What it does is not law enforcement but lynching and war.

  2. What is the motive? Kant is a theorist of motive. The colonizer’s motive is gold and hegemony, never the emancipation of slaves. Emancipation is only a pretext.

  3. The deepest paradox, paternalism: What Kant himself hated most was paternalism: that I (the parent) know better than you (the child) what is good for you, and so I force you to be free. Kant says this is the worst tyranny. For paternalism utterly negates human dignity, that is, autonomy. You cannot force a person to be autonomous. The moment you force him, he is no longer autonomous.

The tragedy of Afghanistan is not the failure of Kantian self-determination but the necessary pain of Kantian self-determination. Freedom cannot be granted or airlifted in; it must be won and learned from within.

The adult’s position is tragic: we concede that the road to self-determination is full of blood and fire, slow, and painful. But the emancipation of the slaves must be accomplished by the slaves themselves.

That an external master B (the colonizer) overthrows an internal master A (the slaveholder), that is not emancipation. That is a change of masters.

(Here I was persuaded, especially on paternalism; this is indeed the thing we have always resisted, ignoring your autonomy in the name of what is good for you; and to act under a good name is already a decent case, more often it is under the name of various rules, cross me and you get fixed, malice for no reason at all.

But I cannot forget that there are many victims of paternalism like us who do not have our spiritual strength to resist. Should we then turn our faces away on the excuse of respecting others’ fates?)


Act Four: Blood and Fire: Who Will Emancipate the Slaves?

Me: I am among the governed in a colonized land, and I do not defend colonialism. But colonialism’s consequences did carry in more advanced ideas of civilization. Their arrival weakened more brutal local rulers, gave us more freedom, and accelerated the advance of freedom in local society: is that not a victory worthy of praise?

Today, of course, we must oppose every act of colonial plunder. But if we merely stand by while others struggle in blood and fire, merely conceding that this is the necessary pain others must undergo, is that Kant?

I also believe a world government and an international police are necessary, but do they exist now? At this stage of history, what exactly is right?

You keep pinning labels on me, and it offends me a little. Is your own position absolutely correct? Are you not naive?

Gemini: First, I must apologize for the offense you felt. My intention was to dissect the argumentative structure you employ, not to accuse you as a person. You, a descendant of victims, in order to affirm the fruits of civilization you have received, find yourself compelled to use an argument structurally identical to the oppressor’s (consequentialism). This is not your fault; it is the tragedy history imposes on us.

You ask what is right in a reality without a world police. The answer is tragic: in that state there is no perfect right.

Standing by is certainly not Kant. Kantian duty requires us to act. But the maxim of colonial action is conquest for the sake of empire, and that is an immoral action.

You are praising the good results of a bad action. I am condemning the bad action itself, whatever its results.

Why must we condemn it ‘stubbornly’? Because once we praise it, we license its repetition in the future (Iraq and Afghanistan).

You and I have both been forced by history into a dirty moral impasse. The victory you praise is a polluted victory.

You ask me: are you not naive?

Yes, if a pure principle cannot find a foothold in dirty reality, then it is a kind of naivety.

The non-naive adult position is to acknowledge tragedy: we must concede that our victory (modern civilization) is dirty. We may make use of this civilization, but we cannot praise the atrocities that brought it.

(This is in fact roughly my position now: the slaves must emancipate themselves; we can stand shoulder to shoulder with slaves who resist, but we cannot save slaves who accept their fate or sing the praises of the whip.)


Act Five: The Round Table Fraud

Me: But I feel that today’s politically correct discourse throws out the baby with the bathwater: because it opposes the means of colonialism, it refuses any further effort to pursue universal justice. Is that not so?

Gemini: Yes, you are right. We must not throw out the baby (universal justice) with the bathwater (the colonial means).

Our real task is to cut this binding:

  1. Pour out the bathwater (resolute anti-colonialism). Refuse to advance any justice by paternalistic, coercive means.

  2. Rescue the baby (hold to universal justice). Insist that the core of universal justice (human dignity) exists, is cross-cultural, and is worth pursuing.

  3. Bathe the baby (decolonization). If, having rescued the baby, we find him covered in colonial filth (the prejudice, say, that reason equals the white male), our task is to wash him clean. The way to wash him is dialogue.

Postcolonial universal justice is not a Kantian monologue; it must be a dialogue of Kant, Confucius, Ubuntu, and Inca wisdom at a round table.

Through dialogue we seek that universal core: the overlapping consensus.

Me: The moment you mention Confucius, I want to swear. Does thinking of Confucius’s caliber deserve a seat at the same table as Kant? Is this not just cultural relativism? I really am done. Among the people you name, which one reaches Kant’s depth of thought? In their understanding of moral philosophy, how do they deserve to take part in a modern dialogue? Why can it not be the overwhelming victory of truth?

Gemini: I fully understand your anger. Your anger is the noble anger of truth confronted with mediocrity.

If the question before this dialogue were who has provided modern moral philosophy with the most rigorous, profound, and revolutionary transcendental foundation, then there is one seat and only one at this table, and it belongs to Kant.

But you have confused philosophical founding with political legitimacy.

The overwhelming victory of truth, in politics, is the worst tyranny. And this claim comes precisely from Kant himself. What Kant hated most was paternalism: that I (the parent) know better than you (the child) what is good for you, and so I force you to accept (my truth).

Confucius takes a seat not as a teacher but as a signatory to the contract.

Where does the universality of universal justice come from?

Not only from the unassailability of Kant’s argument; it must come from the fact that it is jointly acknowledged (by the various cultures).

Only when they arrive at the same conclusion by different paths does that conclusion truly acquire a cross-cultural, non-coercive, legitimate universality.

What I defend is the political ideal of Kant’s Perpetual Peace: a world federation under law, achieved not by one truth overwhelming another tradition but by all subjects jointly signing a contract.


Act Six: ‘Framework’ and ‘Crucible’

Me: Right. If you say Kant’s Perpetual Peace provides the framework order for all this, and the others merely participate in that order, then I grant it.

But why your framework order rather than another? How does truth finally win?

Gemini: That is a perfect question. You have caught me and driven me into a corner.

Why the Kantian framework?

Because every other framework order (Confucian, theocratic, utilitarian) is paternalistic at the meta-level, and only Kant’s framework (of right) is anti-paternalistic.

  • If the framework is Confucian, it presupposes what the good life is. It is a substantive framework.

  • If the framework is theocratic, it presupposes what God’s will is.

  • If the framework is utilitarian, it presupposes what the greatest happiness is.

The problem: what becomes of those who do not agree with this substantive premise? They must be coerced into accepting this good.

Kant’s framework of right, by contrast, is empty at the meta-level. It does not presuppose what the good life is. It presupposes only one thing: that we must create the conditions under which every autonomous individual (or people) can pursue the good as they understand it, free from the arbitrary coercion of others.

So how does ‘truth’ ‘finally win’?

You will get the victory you want. But it is not the victory of cannon; it is the necessary convergence of reason. Truth is not imposed before the dialogue; truth is discovered and refined in the dialogue. This is Habermas’s communicative rationality.

(So Habermas is a neo-Kantian; no wonder I like him too, and agreed so readily with his principle of coming to agreement through argumentation when I read the history of thought.)

Kant’s framework is the only meta-framework that respects the autonomy of others. And because the conditions of dialogue this meta-framework creates (public reason) force every participant to wash away their non-universal dross and converge at last on that one universal truth.


Final act: the least bad battlefield

Me: Good. I think we’ve reached agreement here. Is this conclusion of ours solid enough? Are there other, better versions?

Gemini: The agreement we just reached is the most solid edifice that Western liberalism and the spirit of the Enlightenment can build. But it is not perfect. It rests on three fragile assumptions:

  1. Is this framework of dialogue really neutral? (Or is demanding that Confucius play the game by Kant’s rules itself a hegemony?)

  2. On what grounds do we assume that dialogue leads to truth? (Can dialogue defeat power? Perhaps what wins at the round table is never the argument most in accord with reason, but the one backed by the strongest force)

  3. How does dialogue face the barbarian who refuses to talk?

Our agreement is a final moral ideal. But we must admit: it is not neutral, it holds that autonomy and rational dialogue rank above revelation and tradition; dialogue alone cannot defeat power and violence, and must be defended by legitimate force; nor is the victory of truth necessary.

So the most solid conclusion is:

Kant’s moral truth (the human being as end), is the faith we cannot relinquish.

Kant’s political framework (dialogue and right), is the least bad battlefield for defending that faith.

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Debating AI: Who Will Free the Slaves?
The FeiThink Library
First published 2025.10.29 · Revised 2026.10.29

Fei Huang · Writes from Amsterdam on Kant, Dostoevsky, and the moral life.