The FeiThink Library · Standalone
[Notes] Traditional Government in Imperial China
14 min
Machine translation from the Chinese original, not reviewed by the author.
A political system must of necessity grow from its own roots. Even if some part can be transplanted from abroad, it must first pass through a fusion and intermarriage with the native tradition before it can truly have any effect. Otherwise a lifeless politics, a system with nothing to fit into, can never grow. In other words, an institution must fit the men and the business it handles.
I. Han
They drew a line between the government and the imperial household, setting the chancellor alongside the emperor.
At least they understood that beside the imperial power there is the power of the chancellor; at least they understood that beside the imperial household there is a government.
Then the selection system. At least they understood that the government’s employment of men ought to have an objective standard, and could not rest wholly on the private likes and dislikes of those above. At least they understood that this standard ought not to be nearness of blood, nor size of power. Kin, noble, strong, rich: none of these sufficed for the standard. Instead they adopted a standard that decided appointment, promotion and dismissal by results in education, in knowledge and in administrative apprenticeship, and they understood how to distribute it evenly across every region of the country; this cannot but be counted as rationalized for its time, as enlightened and progressive.
As for economic policy, on one side it urged light corvée and low taxes, indulging the common people; on the other it urged the curbing of the rich and the bringing about of equality. This is neither dark nor unreasonable.
As for the evolution afterward, in the organization of government, in the selection system, in economic policy, faults appeared. The relation of household and government in the end broke into conflict; the selection system in the end produced a new aristocracy of great clans; the economic system and the military service system were never got right, and both went wrong.
But we cannot on that account write it all off, saying that the Han had no institutions, or that all its institutions were mere despotism and darkness.
The Selection System
From the time of Emperor Wu onward, the Han gradually formed a system of one annual nomination from each commandery and kingdom of a xiaolian, a filial and incorrupt candidate.
Once this system took shape, twenty or thirty years later the palace gentlemen were all of them xiaolian from the commanderies and kingdoms; and most of those xiaolian were themselves men who had graduated from the Imperial Academy and been assigned to office.
The system then evolved from nomination by region to allocation in proportion to registered households, fixed at a quota. In that time a commandery or kingdom of two hundred thousand households could nominate one xiaolian. Thereupon xiaolian became merely the name of a qualification for entering politics, and lost the original sense of filial son and incorrupt official.
Finally, after nomination by the commandery or kingdom, the central government added an examination. The system thus brought together four steps, education, administrative apprenticeship, selection and examination, before it reached completion.
The government of China from this point on was neither an aristocracy, nor a military government, nor a government of merchants, but a government that honored civil order, a government of scholars, the shiren. Only these men were allowed onto the political stage; the government was organized by them, and all political power was distributed in their hands.
Chinese political power was thereby opened to every part of the country.
From then on, whether selection or examination, quotas were set by region. Regions backward in economy and culture and regions advanced in economy and culture were alike examined and selected in proportion to population. Hence in the central government there were always men from every region of the country taking part, and no region was favored to the withering of another.
Hence the Chinese government was always national in its representation, and the whole people had the hope of entering it. And in fact there were always men from every part of the country entering the central government.
Again, under the Han system the chief officials of a commandery or county were by rule kept from serving in their own commandery or county. Thus the central government was absolutely national in representation, while local government strove to keep from sinking into mere localism. Only so could the unified order be maintained forever. And with teaching and influence passing between all parts of the country, with customs and manners shifting across them, the cultural and economic levels of every place could move always toward fusion, toward evenness, and not toward isolation, not toward separation.
This system was followed from the Han down to the Qing without a break. It is the point in traditional Chinese political institutions most deserving of attention.
II. Tang
In the organization of the central government: it ended the Three Lords and Nine Ministers system of the first half of history, and opened the Six Ministries of the Department of State Affairs for the second half.
In the selection of the worthy and the capable: it ended the first half’s recommendation by district and village, and opened the second half’s system of examination for office.
In the tax system: it ended the first half’s separate levies of land tax, labor service and local tribute, and opened the second half’s single tax.
In the army: it ended the first half’s universal military service, and opened the second half’s voluntary service.
The Tang is the greatest turning point in the political institutions of Chinese history.
1. The Examination System
To speak from the facts, the examination system was plainly opening up political power, and this is precisely the inner meaning and the spiritual life of the system.
The selection of the Han was one road by which power was opened out of the feudal nobility. The open competition of the Tang was one road by which power was opened out of the class of distinguished pedigree. The scope the Tang opened was broader and freer than the Han’s.
To restrain capital and to even out landholding was on the whole the traditional policy of Chinese history. The intent of political measures was to guide the intelligence and ability of the people, and not to allow the private calculation of family wealth to expand without limit. Hence the educated competed for a place on the political stage and for office; the road to office was crowded, and a political bloat set in, a disease of swelling.
2. The Tax System
The zuyongdiao of the Tang, its levies of grain, service and cloth, was on the whole lighter in amount than the Han’s, and can be called a system of light corvée and low taxes. Moreover the items of zuyongdiao were distinct: only with land was there the grain levy, only with a person was there the service levy, only with a household was there the cloth levy. The highest intention of this system was that whoever bore a person should at the same time have land and a household, so that the light sum the government collected would feel easy to bear and not painful. Herein the Tang system was superior to the Han.
The zuyongdiao of the Tang may be said to have ended the economic tradition handed down in one line from the ancient well-field and the equal-field; while the two-tax system, liangshui, cut the channel for the free economy that followed.
This change of system is the greatest change in the land tax of China; it is one of the largest items in the ancient-to-modern transformation of economic and land institutions in Chinese history.
The two-tax system ended the first half of the history of the land tax, and thereafter there was nothing to do but follow this system with small modifications and keep applying it. This cannot be called a necessary tendency of history, yet there really were conditions of every kind luring and forcing it, and only so did this great change take shape.
III. Song
The Song in relation to the Tang can only be called what the Eastern Han was to the Western Han: there were events, but no government. There was a drift of circumstance, but no establishing of institutions.
IV. Ming
The Abolition of the Chancellor
Modern China begins on the whole with the Ming. The pity is that in the West this stretch of history was one of progress, while in China this stretch was one of retreat. In political institutions at least, it was a great retreat.
If we say that traditional Chinese politics was despotic, the government a dictatorship of one emperor, that saying will do for the Ming and the Qing. But as for the Han, Tang and Song, in the organization of the central government the imperial power and the chancellor’s power were divided. Their proportions may have differed, but it can never be said that everything was despotism by the emperor. Then in the thirteenth year of the Hongwu reign of the Ming founder, according to the official histories, because the chancellor Hu Weiyong rebelled, the Ming founder took the lesson, and from that time abolished the chancellorship and never set it up again. He said moreover that his descendants too should forever be forbidden to establish a chancellor.
So the government of the Ming had no chancellor. The Qing had none either. Hence we say that traditional Chinese politics underwent a great change at the Ming, namely the abolition of the chancellor.
The Ming founder laid it down that no chancellor should be established, and in this his descendants kept to him, and never at any time dared to violate it. As to the ban on eunuchs interfering in government, his descendants did not keep it. The eunuchs of the Ming meddled in government more grievously than in any other dynasty.
If a grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat really wanted to accomplish anything, he too had first to attach himself to the eunuchs. For the Grand Secretariat could not see the emperor’s face, and without joining forces with the eunuchs no affair of government could be passed up to the highest level.
The Ming had a famous grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat, Zhang Juzheng, whom recent men reckon one of the great statesmen of Chinese history, but even he could grasp real power only by attaching himself to the eunuchs.
By the constitution of the government, a grand secretary had no way to preside over decrees. So Zhang Juzheng could unfold his aims only in league with the Directorate of Ceremonial, and so stir the government of his day. But the court officials of the time all opposed Zhang Juzheng, saying he was not like the chancellors of former dynasties, was not the formal administrative head of the government, and ought not to seize power and monopolize rule.
To manage what one ought not manage, to grasp power one ought not grasp: this is a powerful minister, not a great minister.
What we have said above argues only from institutions and constitutional principle, not from achievements and intentions. At least that was how the opposition of the day saw it. We set out this layer in detail precisely to make plain how institutions tie down the men who work them. And the untenability of this Ming institution can be settled all the more firmly on that ground.
V. Qing
1. Tribal Politics
When we speak of political institutions, some are truly institutions, and some can only be called incidents or fashu, the ruler’s private devices. Institutions refer to government; devices are only matters or means, and had better not be called government. Broadly, institutions come out of what is public: the measures and limits formed under a public intent are institutions. Devices come out of what is private, and so have no exact and fitting measure.
Now let us ask again: in the political institutions of China’s successive dynasties, how much came out of what is public, and how much out of what is private? Which carries the greater weight, the meaning of fashu, the ruler’s device, or the meaning of institution?
Of the Han, the Western Han can be called institutional; the Eastern Han came mostly out of Guangwu’s private intent. Of the Tang, one can genuinely say that institutions were established. Of the Song, much can only be counted as a device. Of the Ming, much can only be called incidents, not institutions. Of the Qing in particular, one can say that there were no institutions at all. Every institution it had was copied from the Ming, and onto the Ming institutions it added a great deal of its own private intent. This private intent can be called the private intent of a tribal regime: everything set out from the private intent of the Manchu tribe, so that all was device and no institution was to be seen.
2. The Three Great Freedoms
If these Qing regulations are to be called institutions, they are institutions whose only aim was to keep people from asking about politics. Ask yourself: apart from private intent, what meaning do these institutions carry? And the Qing system did not permit the public any right of open speech. At the time the prefectural and county schools each had a Minglun Hall, and the Qing court placed a stone tablet in every one of them. The tablet was not set upright but laid flat, and so it was called the prostrate tablet. On it were carved several prohibitions:
First, students may not speak on public affairs.
Second, they may not form leagues or associations.
Third, they may not print and publish writing.
These three prohibitions are exactly the freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of the press that modern Westerners sought to win, the so-called three great freedoms. In this, the modern histories of China and the West form an exactly opposite contrast. Spoken plainly, it is enough to make us ashamed inwardly.
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From such points we can see the intent behind the Qing system. The Ming especially encouraged everyone to speak, to speak openly, and not only the Ming system: every dynasty did so. Only the Qing forbade people to speak. What kind of institution is that? It is merely a set of unreasonable devices by which the Manchu tribal regime made it convenient to control China.
VI. Conclusion
1. Total Repudiation
If the whole of traditional culture were overturned, ordinary people would no longer have any heart of common respect and common faith in their country’s past tradition. A country’s politics, in the end, cannot escape power. And the stability of political power must depend on a kind of spiritual power that society at large commonly observes and commonly believes in. Once that power is overturned, and no other power can be set up in time, all political construction becomes impossible.
Today we seem to meet every political institution with an experimental attitude, never having entered into a state of common respect and common faith toward it, trying it out on nothing but a theory. Here the problem is great.
We are even glad to pick up at random and use at random whatever is new in other countries a month or two old, or the new theories of a few men. Today’s Chinese Communist Party is the most extreme example.
2. A Flat Society
From the Song onward, Chinese society became a flat society. The feudal nobility, dukes and earls and the like, had long since been abolished; offices were not hereditary; political power was broadly open, and whoever met the conditions could enter the examinations and take office. This flat society has its defects too. Flattened out, it shows no strength.
You should know that wherever there is organization, there can be strength. Look at the West: in a great factory, with its thousands and tens of thousands of people, the Communist Party stirs them up and uses them for all it is worth; once trouble is afoot, a single strike can have great effect. Because it is an organization, it is a strength. In modern Chinese society no such strength can be found. People are all flat, scattered.
If you would speak of equality, the Chinese are the most equal. If you would speak of freedom, the Chinese are the freest too.
Yet precisely because they are too equal and too free, they cannot have strength. Within equality there is still a crux: who ought to run politics? Government is always high above. If society is equal, who ought to climb up and be an official and hold power?
Our future: if we do not take the road of Western capitalism, then how shall we employ the new politics we shall have, so that society may again have a new point of common respect and common faith and cohere once more around that center? This too is a matter of the utmost importance in politics today.
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First published 2020.04.18